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Although the wider issue of fiscal, monetary and banking coordination lies beyond the 
scope of this paper, the arguments and findings presented here should be definitely a 
part of technical background materials for G20-like meetings in the future. 
Specifically, how fiscal changes in country A affect output in country B is an issue of 
outmost importance for policy coordination. In my discussion, I would like to 
emphasize that government spending on goods on services is only a part of total 
government expenditure. This is especially so in the American case where social 
transfers, such as healthcare expenditure and transfers to states make up most of 
government spending. Nevertheless, the findings born out from the VAR analysis 
presented in the article are definitely interesting and I shall discuss them below in 5 
points. 
 
First, I have to point out that the authors have made a very brave effort in entering the 
fiscal multiplier debate which is one of the most controversial topics among 
macroeconomists. Upper bounds for the fiscal multiplier estimate tend to be around 
0.5 or in other words: an increase in government spending by 1 dollar is expected to 
raise output by 50 cents at most. Considering the fact that imports to the United States 
only make up 15% of GDP and only a part of these imports originate from the UK 
and the Eurozone, the cross-national impact is likely to be limited. 
 
This expectation, which is my second point, is in stark contrast to the empirical 
findings of the paper. These findings reveal a comparable cross-national multiplier to 
what the upper bounds of the domestic multipliers are estimated to be. We must ask 
ourselves how this could be. 
 
That brings me to my third point, which is where I believe the answer mostly lies. As 
already mentioned, government spending on goods and services is only a part of 
overall fiscal measures (transfer payments, tax cuts etc.) and they are likely to be 
correlated. To illustrate this point, one needs to look at the current job bill by the 
Obama administration which amounts to 450 billion $s but very little of that actually 
falls within the measure that the authors use. Alongside, the Fed is considering a new 
wave of monetary stimulus, further adding to domestic demand. Consequently, the 
estimates of around 200-250 billion $s that these multipliers predict greatly overstate 
the actual stimulus brought about by just spending on goods and services. In other 
words, the omission of certain fiscal items and the correlation with monetary policy 
measures artificially bias the estimate of the multiplier. 
 
Fourthly, the time period under study deserves a remark. The years between 1980 and 
2007 haven’t exactly been the high point for discretionary fiscal policy. Until the 70s 
we used to practice activist fiscal policy best epitomized by Nixon’s remarks: “we are 
all Keynesians now”. Later on, mostly due to long lags of fiscal measures, activist 
fiscal policy was discredited. Monetary policy came to the forefront with the severe 
recession and the subsequent recovery engineered by the Fed under Volcker. During 
the Greenspan years, the Fed remained the protagonist in macroeconomic 
management by running monetary policy under a Taylor rule. Discretionary fiscal policy was largely off the table, which makes me sceptical about where the authors’ 
measures are coming from. Short of looking at actual Congressional Budget Office 
documents, like Romer and Romer did, and relying on pure statistical techniques, 
such as the one devised by Blanchard, I suspect that the measures will be strongly 
correlated with monetary policy measures, again overstating the importance of fiscal 
policy. 
 
Fifth and finally, the paper makes very specific assumptions on agents’ behaviour by 
postulating that they anticipate the automatic reductions of fiscal measures in the 
future. However, a large part of where fiscal changes are coming from in the future is 
through legislated policies today. Stopping short of incorporating these measures’ 
future impact on spending and taxes, the model thus assumes that only part of future 
changes will come to be anticipated. 
 
 
 